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Abstract
This case study analyzes the impact of theory-based
factors on the implementation of different blockchain
technologies in use cases from the energy sector. We
construct an integrated research model based on the
Diffusion of Innovations theory, institutional economics
and
the
Technology-Organization-Environment
framework. Using qualitative data from in-depth
interviews, we link constructs to theory and assess their
impact on each use case. Doing so we can depict the
dynamic relations between different blockchain
technologies and the energy sector. The study provides
insights for decision makers in electric utilities, and
government administrations.

1. Introduction
Blockchain is making headlines as the next step in
the evolution of the internet in contemporary tech,
finance and energy press outlets. Simultaneously, the
emergence of renewable, Distributed Energy Resources
(DER) and smart grids creates a network, in which
innumerable devices can automatically communicate
with each other. Regardless of the hype, the potential for
blockchain in the energy sector appears promising. The
automation of processes, disintermediation and the
rethinking of value chains grant degrees of freedom for
innovative applications and business models. Yet, there
are only few market-ready blockchain services, but
rather pilot projects in which specific applications are
tested. Although most publications refer to ‘the’
blockchain, a comprehensive view requires a
differentiation
between
multiple
blockchain
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technologies. Therefore, we analyze the distinctive
characteristics of these technologies and the socioeconomical and institutional context and their
relationship to one another. To explain the dynamics, we
address the following research question:
How and by which factors is the implementation of
blockchain technologies in energy sector use cases
affected?
We utilize a theoretical framework and in-depth
interviews for this analysis. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper to evaluate the implementation of
different blockchains in use cases from the energy
sector. Former research has aimed to define a decision
model for blockchain adoption based on the TOE
framework [8]. However, these authors do not make the
crucial differentiation between distinct types of
blockchain technologies and different business areas.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the research process, followed by an overview
of seminal theoretical literature in section 3.
Subsequently, section 4 provides essential background
information for the energy sector and blockchain
technologies. In section 5, relevant factors impacting on
decision makers are discussed, while section 6 analyzes
implications of these factors for energy use cases. The
concluding section 7 summarizes the most important
insights and limitations and provides an outlook on
future research.

2. Methodology
While there is a great body of non-scientific
literature on the application of blockchains in different
use cases [9, 20, 27], few articles are published in peerreviewed scientific journals. After an initial literature
search with literature databases (EBSCOhost, Google
Scholar) we found Yli-Huumo’s [49] overview as an
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identifier for research gaps. Based on that we formulated
preliminary research questions and initiated the search
for a suitable framework. After reviewing the seminal
body of literature in this field, we decided to use an
integrated framework based on the theoretical
background described in Section 3,
While searching for appropriate interviewees, we
intentionally used our professional network instead of
random sampling to consult experts in specific domains
of blockchains and energy. We found 22 appropriate
interviewees from three distinct groups: (A) Energy
sector decision makers (B) blockchain experts (C)
researchers. We designed a pool of a dozen open
interview questions based on our research aims and
adjusted them according to individual interviewees’
parameters (experience, attitude, position, etc.). All
interviews were executed on the telephone, except for
two email interviews. We used an in-depth and semistructured interview design as suggested by Bewley [3].
Subsequently, we used open coding to identify relevant
variables in the qualitative data, and axial coding to
connect these variables to general factors [13]. We then
assigned these general factors from our data to the
framework (Figure 1).
Factors
Derived from
Literature

Research
Framework

Factors
Identified in
Interviews

Interviews
and Axial
Coding

Impact on
Use Cases

Figure 1. Research process

To design a valid case study, we used multiple
sources of evidence in terms of different mediums
(phone, email and literature) as well as different
stakeholders at different points of the research. To
safeguard reliability as suggested in [48], we repeated
the coding process by different researchers [29]. We
maintained a database with all data about the interviews,
as well as a protocol to document the ongoing progress
of the study for all participating researchers.

3. Theoretical framework
We reviewed the seminal literature for technological
innovation while searching for an appropriate
framework four our study. Regarding the domain of
blockchains, our analysis requires a sound theoretical
foundation that reflects (a) the specific properties of the
blockchain technology, (b) the dynamics of
organizations utilizing blockchains, (c) the highly

regulated nature of the energy sector, and (d) the
external effects of such a networked technology.
During this process, we reviewed the Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM) [42] and the Unified Theory
of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) [43],
but we eventually dismissed these frameworks due to
their focus on individual behavior and lacking
importance of environmental and institutional factors.
In contrast to that, the commonly applied Diffusion of
Innovations theory (DOI) investigates underlying
mechanisms of diffusion and assesses how an
innovation can be implemented in a social system. The
most prominent contribution in this field was made by
Rogers [34], who discusses the dynamics between the
technological innovation itself, organizations to adopt
the innovation and communication channels of the
regarded social system, which addresses (a) and (b).
Building on this, DePietro et al. [16] established the
Technology-Organization-Environment
framework
(TOE) to display constraints and opportunities of a
technological innovation in organizations. They
complement Rogers’ work by adding an environmental
component to the framework. This component flexibly
embodies relations of the organization towards external
units such as government, competition, or technology
infrastructure, addressing (c).
DOI has been criticized for disregarding standards,
network externalities and path dependence [25].
Accordingly, DOI researchers are advised to consider
the nature of the technology, the critical role of
institutional structures, strategies of stakeholders and
the installed infrastructure. Similarly, critics of TOE
state, that the flexibility of the framework is gained at
the expense of accuracy. To address this, the
incorporation of network externalities, described for
instance in [37] has been suggested by [1]. In order to
supplement the shortcomings of DOI and TOE as well
as to address (d), we took on an economic perspective
on blockchains as suggested by [15], drawing on
seminal works in the field of institutional and
information economics such as [6] and [37], considering
network externalities and rent-seeking behavior.
Based on the reviewed literature, we decided to
construct a flexible integrated research framework to
carry out a phronetic analysis as proposed in [17].
Phronetic research is a pragmatic interpretation of the
research object and thus well applicable to case studies.
It does not aim to develop new theories or yield causal
evidence, but rather to contribute to practical rationality
by investigating the dynamics of power and relations in
a social context. With this approach, we aim to reflect
the dynamics of blockchain in the energy sector.
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4. Background
In this section, we differentiate the characteristics of
blockchain
technologies
and
we
illustrate
contemporary developments in the environment of the
energy sector.

4.1. The energy sector
Energy markets are facing changes induced by
technological and socio-economic developments. The
energy generation transitions from conventional
thermal power plants to distributed energy resources.
This induces fluctuating supply, increasing uncertainty.
Energy trade becomes more complex. Additionally,
smart meter gateway tethered devices are replacing
analogous meters. The heterogeneous generation is
causing high volatility. Accordingly, supply and price
are subject to high levels of uncertainty. DER such as
power-heat coupling plants, photovoltaic installations
and biogas plants are becoming more popular for
residents and local organizers. An increasing share of
energy demand can be provided locally, making the grid
balancing a challenging task. The changes of the energy
market increase participation and empowerment for
customers, enabling them to optimize domestic
consumption and to switch retailers [14].

4.2 Distributed ledger technology
A decade ago, the Bitcoin white paper published by
Satoshi Nakamoto [28], introduced the revolutionary
concept of blockchains. The so-called distributed
ledgers are records of transactions distributed to every
computer in the participating network [40]. Unlike
normal databases, it is updated by all network
participants. This process is called Proof-of-Work
(PoW). Miners compete against each other to solve an
algorithmic puzzle and the fastest contestant updates the
database. Trust, which is usually provided by
intermediaries is achieved by the collaboration of the
masses [41]. While every entity that participates in a
blockchain can review the stored information, changes
to the database can only be implemented by reaching a
consensus. Contemporary blockchains have started to
include so-called smart contracts that are negotiated
between parties, stored in code and executed
autonomously. Smart contracts enhance the blockchain
technology to a system of distributed applications and
markets [30]. While the term ‘blockchain’ often refers
to permissionless distributed ledgers, several
publications differentiate between those, permissioned,
and consortium blockchains [2, 44].

Table 1. Blockchain characteristics [2, 44]
Public

Private

Consortium

Access

Permissionless Permissioned Shared Perm.

Personal
information

Pseudonymity

Device
Not required
authentication
Consensus
PoW, PoS
mechanism
Decentralized
Security
control
Transaction
speed
Energy
consumption
System costs
Individual
costs

Known

Known

Required

Conditional

PoS, PoA,
PBFT
Single point
of failure

PoW,PoS,
PoA
Various

Low (PoW)

Rather High

Higher than
public

High (PoW

Rather Low

Rather low

High

Rather low

Medium to low

Low

Rather high

Various

4.3. Public (permissionless) blockchains
The prominent blockchains Bitcoin and Ethereum
are permissionless and public (Table 1). These ledgers
are accessible to anyone and participants are represented
by a random ID (pseudonymity). There is no central
provider to supervise the ongoing traffic or to admit new
applications. Permissionless blockchains allow the
participation of random unknown devices without initial
checks of trustworthiness. These blockchains
historically rely on the PoW consensus mechanism, in
which every miner can validate new data blocks.
However, some blockchains have already implemented
efficient alternatives, such as the “Proof-of-Stake”
mechanism (PoS), which randomly selects network
participants who own a stake of the network’s tokens to
validate transactions [7].

4.4. Private (permissioned) blockchains
Permissioned (private) blockchains only grant
access to known participants, who might have rights to
read and/or write data. The system provider has full
control over the blockchain and he knows all
participants a priori. Generally, he can roll back certain
processes making permissioned blockchains potentially
reversible. The validation of single blocks is possible at
much lower resource consumption and higher speed, as
not all participants are simultaneously working on the
solution of the algorithmic puzzle. Instead, in the Proofof-Authority (PoA) consensus mechanism, a single
node generates new data blocks. The formerly described
PoS can also be employed in permissioned
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environments. For instance the open-source PoS engine
Tendermint can be used as the base infrastructure for
different types of blockchains [7]. A similar approach,
the Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (PBFT)
consensus algorithm [10] is utilized by Hyperledger
Fabric [18]. Based on PBFT, a single authority issues
permissions for membership to a network of known
participants, in which only few whitelisted nodes
validate transactions.

4.5. Consortium blockchains and multi-purpose
technologies
Consortium blockchains are a compromise between
public and private blockchains in which only verified
participants can validate blocks. These blockchains
offer the possibility to be tailored towards the specific
requirements of the consortium, e.g. by removing
pseudonymity. Apart from the three blockchains
categories established in prior works [44], there is a
multitude of protocols, forks and platforms that can be
incorporated or built on as blockchain components. For
instance, Tendermint is most prominently used as the
core of the Cosmos project, which aims at enabling a
seamless exchange of tokens between different
blockchains [7, 23]. Similarly, Ethereum’s co-founder
Gavin Wood developed Polkadot [47], a relay channel
network to parallelize different chains. The other
Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin is involved in
Plasma, a concept to scale different blockchains in
Ethereum smart contracts [32]. Due to the appearance of
the versatile technologies stated above, the categorical
differentiation of distributed ledger technologies has
become more complex throughout the last year. For this
work, the main characteristic to categorize a blockchain
is the access to the network and consensus mechanism
that defines which entities are permitted to validate
transactions.

5. Critical factors in the domain of
blockchain technologies
In this section, we assess the innovation diffusion
factors from the theory, linked with the most relevant
factors impacting on the use of blockchain technologies
from our qualitative data. The mapping of axial codes
from the interviews to theory-based factors is depicted
in Table 2.

5.1. Market power and competitive pressure
Competitive pressure is an established pillar of
innovation diffusion research. Customer power, threat
of new entrants, industry rivalry and threat of substitutes

impact on market power dynamics [33]. Incumbents
holding significant market power, generally aim to keep
the status quo instead of sponsoring innovative
technologies. If an innovation arises, pressure from
startups and customers increases. To secure the market
share, incumbents will likely engage with the
innovation, yet prevent the occurrence of network
externalities that may benefit competitors. Therefore, a
company in a dominant market position may not support
efforts to foster interoperability. Instead, it may capture
this process, tighten path dependencies and aim to raise
switching-costs [37].

5.2. Regulation and rent-seeking behavior
The regulatory environment refers to the support or
barriers given by a government authority and is
considered to be a major factor for technological
innovation [50].
Although no blockchain-specific regulation has
passed legislation so far, obligatory guidelines for the
registration as market participants may be a an obstacle
for permissionless blockchains [36]. Further, regulation
generally relies on the written form. Conventional
contracts are characterized by a certain degree of
openness, can be interpreted in certain ways and are not
suitable to be represented by a smart contract. When a
contracted service is not being delivered, no mediator
will enforce laws and nobody may be found liable in a
permissionless blockchain [2]. The application of smart
contracts is therefore less problematic within
permissioned blockchains, where all participants are
known.
Since regulation is part of a complex legislative
process involving government agents and public
representatives, there is potential for political rentseeking as described in [6]. Blockchain technologies
generally pose a threat for power-holding entities as
they efficiently distribute information and decrease the
necessity for established stakeholders.

5.3. Technology characteristics
The emphasis on technology characteristics in the
DOI theory equates with the categorization of
technology in the TOE framework [1]. The interviews
exhibited three codes linked to technology
characteristics.
Transparency. Lack of trust forces trading parties
either to rely on manual processes or to engage
presumably trustworthy intermediates. Whenever such
an intermediary agent is employed, principal-agent
problems and rent-seeking behavior induced by
incomplete contracts can arise [11]. These
manifestations may be addressed with distributed
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ledgers. In a permissionless blockchain all current and
historic transactions are publicly viewable, creating full
transparency of the network. Doing so, permissionless
blockchains can eliminate opportunism [15]. In contrast,
permissioned blockchains can be configured to provide
transparent information to network participants (or even
the public). However, the governing authority can easily
withdraw this feature. Accordingly, optional
transparency in the absence of real immutability may
not foster trust in the same way a permissionless
blockchain can. Incomplete contracts remain an issue
since smart contracts in blockchain are less complete
than conventional ones [2]. Unspecified when-ifrelations in smart contracts, can still be exploited by
human behavior. Accordingly a full substitution of trust
by blockchains is only feasible in markets using nonhuman agents like a Decentralized Autonomous
Organization (DAO), while human involvement leaves
room for the execution of power dynamics [15].
Transaction speed. Today the capacity of
permissionless blockchains is sufficient for discrete
tasks. For a large-scale use of the technology however,
the transaction speed of is one of the key limiting
factors. The Ethereum blockchain currently allows only
for 10–20 transaction per second (tps). For comparison,
the Visa network carries out 1667 tps (PayPal 193 tps)
on average [51]. Current permissionless blockchains are
not yet suitable for high-frequency transactions when
PoW is used. In contrast to that, permissioned
blockchains do not have any technology-specific
restrictions regarding the transaction speed. All nodes in
the network are known and trustworthy, thus the
validation of transactions is trivial. The PBFT

mechanism is built to reach consensus fast and
efficiently, allowing tens of thousands tps [45].
Currently, the Energy Web Foundation (EWF), funded
by the Rocky Mountain Institute is establishing a PoAbased permissioned blockchain platform. Building on
Ethereum as a basis, this platform uses so-called state
channels, in which results of transactions are grouped
together in a smart contract. This significantly increase
the scalability of blockchain transactions. The state
channel network Kovan for instance reaches 1.000 tps
[52].
Transaction costs. Generally, the innovation
literature considers costs to be an inhibitor of
technology use [24]. The experts from our interviews
considered this true for permissionless blockchains. At
the same time, they identified permissioned
blockchains’ cost-effectiveness to be a major advantage.
Permissionless blockchains’ system costs (with PoW)
are perceived as a key obstacle. The operation costs of
the Ethereum network amounts 93.440.000$ per year
[39]. However, these operational costs mostly consist of
the transaction fees. A simple Ethereum transaction
costs about $0,12 cents on the current exchange rate
[46], which is still inexpensive compared to existing
payment service providers (PayPal: $0.30 plus 2.9% of
the volume [53]).

5.4. Security
In the domain of security, our qualitative data
exhibited codes that equated to the basic components of
computer security (confidentiality, integrity and
availability [4]).

Table 2. Axial coding from qualitative data
Theory-based factors

Axial codes

Competitive Pressure

Market power

17

Regulatory Environment
Rent-Seeking Behavior

Regulation

14 models and thus innovation.

Transaction Speed

12

Transparency

16

Transact. Costs

20

Integrity

18

Confidentiality

12

Technology characteristics

Security

Availability
Compatibility
Network Externalities
Path Dependencies

Interoperability

n Exemplary quote from interviews
Customers are longing for someone who is in charge, a service
contact. This only works in permissioned blockchains.
The current regulation regarding grid fees prevent new business

4
14

The potential for permissionless blockchains is limited by
transactions speed.
When all generation data is transparent, we will experience less
conflicts regarding shared ownership of pv systems.
In some areas, we can reduce about 80% of the operational costs.
Inside the blockchain all data is safe. It is the interface to the
physical world where threats occur.
The right to be forgotten is not applicable in blockchains.
Permissionless blockchains are always available. Not even the IT
systems of stock exchanges can provide that.
In permissionless blockchains, devices that have not met before
can spontaneously make transactions with each other.
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Integrity. The immutability feature of blockchains
(the prevention of unauthorized change) is a key
characteristic for data integrity. A permissionless
blockchain is immutable, as it is almost impossible to
alter stored information without being detected. Doing
so, an attacker would need 50% of the network’s
computing power when based on PoW [35]. Although
the resilience against internal or external threats has yet
to be investigated, a major vulnerability in a
Decentralized Application (DApp) has been exposed by
the prominent case of the so-called “Ethereum DAOHack”, in which an incomplete smart contract enabled a
financial exploit.
Due to the similarity to centralized systems,
permissioned and consortium blockchains do not exhibit
a specific advantage regarding integrity, since nodes in
permissioned blockchains can easily agree to alter the
existing database.
Availability. In the TOE framework, availability
refers to the accessibility of a given technology for an
organization. Unlike in centralized architectures,
blockchains are not subject to a single point of failure.
Although an attack may hit the permission-issuing entity
in private blockchains, several other nodes store
identical copies of the database, safeguarding its
availability. Even further, permissionless blockchains
are shared among large numbers of participants [41]. If
one entity of the network breaks off, the remaining
participants will keep the system running. However,
while a distributed infrastructure is resilient to shocks,
most DApps run on few conventional web servers,
which can be hacked.
Confidentiality.
Although
permissionless
blockchains provide pseudonymity, it is possible to
identify entities behind the unique address by analyzing
the data on blockchain [38]. Blockchains hold personal
information that remain in the distributed database due
to the immutability characteristic. Although the
legislative environment of many countries grants
customers the right to have personal information
removed or transferred (data portability), this is not
feasible in a permissionless blockchain unless a hard
fork of the entire chain is carried out. Although this
affects permissioned blockchains as well, central
authority makes it easier to cut-off parts of the
transaction history.

5.5. Compatibility and network externalities
In the DOI literature, compatibility refers to the
suitability of a technology within a given technological
system of an organization [34]. Consistent with that, our
interviewees identified the interoperability of different
devices within networks as a major determinant for
technology implementation. The value of a network is

determined by the number of its participants [5]. When
path dependence is present, the establishment of a
practical migration strategy is important to secure a
critical mass of network traffic. One way is to cooperate
with other stakeholders and engage in standardization
efforts to minimize switching costs [37]. In this context,
the International Organization for Standardization has
established a technical committee (ISO/TC 307) for
interoperability and data exchange on distributed ledger
technologies [22]. Regarding the realization of network
effects, permissionless blockchains are advantageous by
allowing spontaneous authentication of devices.
Alternatively, hybrid- and multi-purpose chains able to
combine interoperability and process efficiency.

6. Impact on energy use cases
After the identification of factors derived from
literature and interviews, we now discuss their impact.
Figure 2 depicts the line of argument between the
identified factors and their relationship to use cases from
the energy sector. Based on the qualitative data,
relationships with strong effects are displayed in bold,
while conditional or and weak relationships are
displayed in dashed lines.

6.1. Microgrids and local residential p2p-trade
The prominent showcase built by LO3 and
ConsenSys, the Brooklyn Microgrid (BMG) has proven
technical feasibility of permissionless blockchains in
microgrids. Similarly, the innogy spin-off company
Conjoule operates a platform, allowing residential
prosumers to sell excess electricity to local consumers,
which is currently being piloted in two German cities
[54]. The BMG use case’s market design has been
evaluated in [26]. The authors consider the regulatory
environment to be major challenge for microgrids.
Residential P2P-trade is illegal in most jurisdictions and
only feasible in the BMG by incorporating LO3 as a
licensed utility. While the BMG originally relied on the
conventional Ethereum blockchain, LO3 has recently
teamed up with Siemens to develop a permissioned
Ethereum solution, incorporating the Tendermint
consensus mechanism [26].
In a multi-directional cellular energy distribution
system, there is a necessity for entities that ensure
compliance with physical restrictions. Grid users must
be known for that reason and possibly as well to fulfill
other legal and regulatory requirements (taxation,
know-your-customer laws). Accordingly, a private
entity or consortium simplifies the operation of a
microgrid. Further, the energy sector is experiencing a
shift of power dynamics towards customers.
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Factors Established
in Literature

Constructs Identified in
Interviews

Competitive
Pressure

Market Power

6.3. Wholesale electricity markets
Blockchains enable direct electricity trade without
intermediaries. The Ponton Enerchain tool currently
enables the wholesale trade for two dozen European
utilities by the use of the Tendermint consensus
algorithm for permissioned blockchains [31]. In contrast
to that, ConsenSys is currently initializing Grid+, a
project aiming to use a permissionless Ethereum-based
platform incorporating state channels to connect
consumers directly to the wholesale market [12]. The
utilization of a state channels network can safeguard
Impact on Use Cases

Utilized Technology
Centralized

Grid Services

PoA

Transaction Speed

PBFT

Transaction Costs

Wholesale
Electricity Markets

Consortium
Hybrid

Technology
Characteristics

Regulation

PoS

Regulatory
Environment

Central
Database

Microgrids
Rent Seeking
Behavior

Availability

Certification of
Green Electricity

PoS

Transparency

Network
Externalities
Path
Dependencies

Asset
Management
PoW

Integrity
Compatibility
Confidentiality

Interoperability

State Channels

Security

Multi-Purpose Chain

The increasing number of DER with fluctuating
generation challenges existing means for grid
monitoring and balancing. Based on a permissioned
blockchain, Ponton deployed a software (Gridchain) in
Austria to coordinate balancing power request between
Transmission System Operators (TSOs), Distribution
System Operators (DSOs) and aggregators within
seconds [55]. A different project started as joint venture
of transmission grid operator Tennet and the battery
storage producer sonnen, aims to reduce the need for
redispatch measures with home battery storage by
utilizing the permissioned Hyperledger Fabric [56].

Permissioned

6.2. Grid services

Also, the Rocky Mountain Institute is investigating
blockchain based platforms applicability for DSOs [57].
Therefore, the associated Energy Web Foundation
(EWF) is currently evaluating this use case for their
permissioned blockchain solution.
Monitoring the status of the grid and taking stability
measures requires high-integrity data, which is
available constantly and in near-real-time for a small
number of participants (DSO, TSO). Today, only
permissioned projects are focusing these services, since
the grid is considered a critical infrastructure and the
regulatory environment will only grant a small number
of entities insight and control.

Permissionless

Blockchains eliminate the need for intermediaries since
transactions can be placed without third parties [40].
The increasing power of consumers incentives utilities
to secure their market power. Customer-friendly
products like smart home applications may be offered to
influence switching costs, tighten path dependencies
and thus prevent the realization of network effects.
Simultaneously, cooperation with rent-seeking political
representatives may occur to keep regulatory barriers in
place, minimizing market threats of prosumer-driven
projects.

E-mobility
Charging
Infrastructure
Distributed

Figure 2. Research framework and relationships between factors and use cases
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transaction speed and scalability of a permissionless
blockchain to realize network externalities.
While the reduction of transaction costs through
disintermediation and transaction speed are major
factors for wholesale trade, market power and rentseeking behavior have relevant impact, as stakeholders
(traders and exchanges) may prefer consortiumcontrolled or permissioned blockchain solutions. A
permissionless blockchain may only be favored when a
critical mass of participants can be achieved by an
appropriate scalability mechanism as used in multipurpose chains.

A green energy certificates ledger must build on
reliable information, accessible to stakeholders and
citizens. While both permissionless and permissioned
blockchains can grant transparency of information, the
latter system can potentially disregard immutability and
thus data integrity by cutting off the transaction history.
When such a system is used to monitor ecological
policies, decision makers may exhibit rent-seeking
behavior when interest groups push for an installment
of manipulable permissioned systems.

6.4. Asset management

The infrastructure of charging stations for electric
vehicles is defined by a vast number of different
providers with different procedures for billing and
accounting. Currently, transactions are subject to
numerous underlying processes between providers and
intermediaries to identify users. The startup share &
charge, a spin-off founded within the innogy innovation
hub, currently operates a blockchain charging
infrastructure with more than 1200 stations, partly
owned by private citizens [21]. The company is using
smart contracts on top of the permissionless Ethereum
blockchain, to grant automatized transactions between
charging stations and electric vehicles.
Besides confidentiality of personal location data, and
availability to safeguard charging at any given time, emobility requires a system in which unknown nodes can
carry out spontaneous transactions without prior
identification. Although this could be provided by a
permissionless blockchain as executed by [21], the emobility environment already exhibits path dependence
in form of pre-existing technologies. Further, devices
have to be linked in order to enable compatibility in
terms of seamless transactions and the exploitation of
network externalities. Accordingly, the utilization of
multi-purpose chains may be of interest for incumbent
stakeholders. Alternatively, a permissionless blockchain
that already has reached critical market dominance or
far-reaching standardization efforts may provide similar
potentials.

The monitoring, metering and status documentation
of specific energy resources can be coordinated via
blockchains. This way, data regarding ownership
structures, load profiles, and maintenance status can be
made available for engineers and investors. Currently,
one of the interviewees is initializing an asset
management pilot study, utilizing the Ethereum
blockchain for valuation of DER. Consulting services
such as due diligence or asset valuations for municipal
utilities can be automated with the aim to make small
assets fungible. Investors of DER can benefit from
transparent and high-integrity information. In contrast
to grid services, in asset management a higher number
of network participants may rely on the stored data.
Therefore, employing a permissionless blockchain
requires a scalable consensus mechanism like PoS.

6.5. Certification of green electricity
Renewable power plants typically must be certified
by multiple institutions through costly processes to trade
Renewable Energy Certificates (REC). Residential
customers do usually not receive reliable information on
their actual share of green energy. Therefore, the startup
StromDAO has implemented a real-time electricity
account, utilizing the a PoA version of the Ethereum
blockchain. The electricity consumption of households
is being evaluated by an index indicating the share of
renewables in the regional energy mix. Depending on
their consumption and procurement behavior,
participating
households
receive
tokens
(Grünstromjetons) corresponding to their individual
share of green electricity [19]. A different approach is
tested by the Chinese Energy-Blockchain Lab using
IBM’s Hyperledger. This permissioned blockchain
serves as a common ledger for carbon emission quotas
to incentivize ecological behavior among China’s
industrial companies. Hyperledger allows transactions
to be either confidential or public, fostering the
transparency of the energy generation process [58].

6.6. E-mobility charging infrastructure

7. Conclusion & outlook
In this paper, we investigated how and by which
factors the implementation of blockchain technologies
is affected in energy sector use cases. We have
constructed an integrated research framework based on
factors from DOI, TOE and institutional economics. On
this foundation, we conducted semi-structured in-depth
interviews with 22 experts from the energy sector,
blockchain enterprises and research institutions. Based
on the interviews, we used axial coding to identify
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constructs related to the theory and analyzed their
impact on the blockchain use cases.
Both grid services and microgrids are clearly
affected by power induced factors and technological
constraints. Especially permissioned blockchains
exhibit properties that equate with these factors,
appropriating a system controlled by only few entities.
The wholesale electricity trade exhibits strong
relationships to technological constraints, while weak
links to power-induced and network-related factors can
be observed. The effects have counteracting directions,
therefore either permissioned or scalable permissionless
solutions could fit the requirements of a given project.
Both asset management and certification of green
electricity are affected by trust-supplementing factors,
indicating a system with reliable data and potentially
reading access for multiple entities. E-mobility charging
infrastructure is strongly affected by network-related
factors that indicate a requirement of open and
interoperable systems, such a multi-purpose chains.
This is the first scientific study to depict dynamics
between blockchain use cases and theory-based
determinants. The work provides insight in factors
relevant to the implementation of blockchain use cases
and the design of economic and political institutions for
the regulation of blockchain technologies. However, the
study is limited by its focus on the energy sector and is
thus lacking generalizability. While we only
interviewed about two dozen experts, we do not aim to
develop new theories but rather to contribute to the
understanding of the dynamics in a specific sociotechnological context. For future research, we aim to
supplement our qualitative research with a quantitative
analysis to validate the results. We further consider an
extension of this approach to other industries.
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